The Paths of Essence

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This talk has two parts, the first historical and the second philosophical. I will be suggesting that the philosophical explains the historical.

We are all familiar with the fact that there are many editions of Hegel's logic. The logic of being appears in the *Science of Logic* in 1812, in the *Encyclopedia* editions of 1817, 1827, 1830, in a second edition in 1831 and 1832. The logic of essence appears in the *Science of Logic* in 1813 and in the *Encyclopedia* editions. The logic of the concept appears in the *Science of Logic* in 1816 and in the *Encyclopedia* editions. There is also the recently published set of notes on Hegel's lectures on logic in the summer of 1831.

Many readings of his project Hegel claim that wants to show the necessary development of a scientific chain of pure thought. This is usually coupled with the claim that the truly necessary sequence should be unique. There are differences among the versions of the logic. This might be expected since the task is difficult. Or it might cause doubts about the task, some of which I mention below. In this paper I am interested in the way the differences are small in the logics of being and of the concept but extensive in the logic of essence. Why is that? What is there about the logic of essence that makes it more open to rearrangement?

The Logic of the Concept

We can look briefly at the logics of the concept and of being. A comparison of Hegel's table of contents for the logic of the concept in the 1816 *Science of Logic* and the sequence drawn from the 1830 *Encyclopedia* shows some changes in the phrasing of the categories, and more detail in the longer early text, but overall there is little difference. (See image 1.) The only significant change at the level of detail provided by this comparison is the disappearance of a section on the fourth figure of the syllogism. In 1813 Hegel uses that section to discuss mathematical argument that stays purely general (A-A-A). In the *Encyclopedia* version (§187) Hegel says that the fourth figure was added by later writers after Aristotle and is not needed. Removing the fourth figure changes how the transition to the discussion of the quantities of the syllogism is done. This is the only sizable change in content and sequence-necessity in the logic of the concept.

Why is the logic of the concept so stable? I wonder if this is because it may have a firm outline brought from outside, much as Kant used traditional logic in constructing his own
table of categories. Hegel is using standard logical terms common at the time. The derivation of the four modes of the syllogism follows the traditional numerical order. Judgments are divided into the standard classes in the order Kant used. This order first appears in the logic for the lower class in the Propaedeutik (1808ff), which is only a list of terms and contains no dialectical progression. The dialectical logics of the concept in the Propaedeutik and the later editions all follow the same order. It is true that Hegel wants to show necessity behind the traditional analyses of language and argument, but it is curious that this necessary order should be so conveniently traditional.

Hegel is also using the talk of concept, judgment, syllogism to sketch ontological modes of being and acting. My point is that the sequence of his discussion may be guided by the traditional categories and a standard order of exposition, which give the logic of the concept a firm skeleton. (It is another question whether this causes problems for the stated goal of a purely internal development.)

Hegel does go beyond tradition in the Idea sections. In the Objectivity sub-section he follows Aristotle's general sequence (inanimate matter, living things, animals, cognitive humans), but instead of Aristotle's inanimate matter and four causes, Hegel brings in post-Cartesian Mechanism and its external causality. And in the Absolute Idea Hegel brings in his own new kinds of concepts and new language uses that have been operative in his logic and its meta-vocabulary.

**The Logic of Being**

For the logic of being, the 1830 Encyclopedia is not Hegel's last word on the subject, because the 1831 second edition of the Science of Logic offers a revised logic of being, which was in 1832 put together with the older logics of essence and concept from the first edition.

Comparing the two Science of Logic editions of the logic of being, the second is much longer, largely due to expanded treatments in the section on Quantity and more nuanced discussions in the section on Measure (which had been shortchanged in the Encyclopedia versions). The notion of die Sache selbst is introduced into the discussion of Measure, as is the pattern of double transitions, which are emphasized again in the Absolute Idea.

The most obvious changes in the sequence of categories occur in the section on Dasein, where categories about determination and limitation are rearranged. (See image 2.)

Though it is difficult to tell because of the brevity of its Dasein section, it appears that the 1830 Encyclopedia shows the beginning of the changes that will appear in the 1832
sequence. Textual comparisons with the notes from Hegel's summer 1831 lectures on the Logic show that he was by then using phrasings that show up neither in the 1813 nor in the 1830 logics of being, but do appear in the 1832 edition. (See Udo Rameil's preface, Lec xxxv.) The editor's introduction to the summer lectures quotes from letters that make clear how intensively Hegel was working on the logic of being in the months before his death.

There are many differences in the added notes, the Anmerkungen, many of which in the second edition clarify misreadings of the first edition, and extend Hegel's points. I call attention to the prominence in the first edition of notes titled "the customary" use of this or that concept. There are fewer notes with that title in the second edition but similar discussions occur there too. (An issue lurks here that will return later.)

The logic of being, then, stays relatively stable, except for added material and a rearranged sequence of categories around the notions of Bestimmtheit and otherness. The larger framework is suggested by the traditional discussion of quality and quantity, but the details are Hegel's own, and he distinguishes categories that some other thinkers might run together.

The Logic of Essence

Now we turn to the logic of essence, then, where changes are the most numerous. I will be suggesting that there are philosophical reasons why the paths of essence are more devious than those of being and the concept.

Within essence many sequences stay more or less the same and in the same location, for example the discussion of relations (Verhältnis) contains the same categories in the same order, and in the same place at the end of essence.

Other sequences stay the same internally but are located differently. For example the section on the determinations of reflection (Wesenheiten or Reflexionsbestimmungen) has a new position as a second rather than a first moment (See image 3; Richard discusses this in his paper).

Other sequences are dismantled. The category of ground in the 1830 Encyclopedia is a subsection whereas before in the 1816 logic it was a chapter on its own, raised in dialectical importance. The 1816 chapter contains many mediations and discussions that are found -- often with similar content -- scattered into new locations in the 1830 Encyclopedia. (See image 4.) For instance, the discussion of form/matter occurs in the 1816 logic before the introduction of the category of the thing. In the 1830 Encyclopedia the discussion of form/matter occurs after the development of the category of the thing, and it is not tied to the
other form-categories developed in the 1816 logic. Of those, one, form/essence, disappears, and the other, form/content, moves from the first major sub-section of the essence section into the second, where it occurs as a subcategory of appearance as a transition to the discussion of substantial relations.

Another example is the discussion of thing, attributes, and matters, which is internally more or less the same in both the 1816 logic and 1830 Encyclopedia, but it is located quite differently. (See image 5.) In the 1816 Science of Logic, the category of matters is taken as a more developed category than the pairs form/matter and form/content. In the 1830 Encyclopedia, the category of matters is taken as less developed than those pairs. The thing/matters section itself is relocated in these ways but it is not much altered internally.

**Questioning Versions**

In an earlier essay, to which Richard has alluded, I argued that the multiple versions, especially of the logic of essence, raise difficulties for the reading of the logic as a strictly necessary sequence of self-developing pure thought. There is the difficulty that "pure" thought is expressed in impure historical language. There is the difficulty of discerning which of the versions is "correct" without appealing to outside criteria or to personal intuition. There is the difficulty in the way Hegel maneuvers relatively stable modules of text to different positions in the sequence. There are also difficulties with the presuppositions of the supposedly presuppositionless approach.

In his paper Richard replied indirectly to some but not all of my earlier claims. His reply was twofold, first an attempt to show that one version was better than another in the beginning of the logic of essence, second a general claim that this showed that the Encyclopedia version was nothing but an introduction or summary of the Science of Logic, which should be considered the authoritative version. He writes,"The Encyclopedia Logic, after all, is merely a guide for accompanying his university lectures, a guide that throughout severely compresses the more complete argument supplied by the Science of Logic."

I think Richard has indeed shown the virtues of the 1813 beginning in its fuller treatment of transitions that are only casually referred to in the Encyclopedia versions. But as elsewhere Richard's mode of argument depends on an intuitive judgment of the adequacy of rival narrations, measured by the presuppositions of a content-less beginning and a goal of pure self-presence of thought to itself, which I have argued elsewhere are "metaphysical" presuppositions in the special sense that Heidegger proposes for that term.

The historical facts cast doubts on Richard's other claim. The 1830 Encyclopedia logic of
being is indeed a summary for class use, but it is best read as approaching the soon-to-appear second edition of the logic of being. Should we not conclude that the changes in the 1830 logic of essence are leading towards what Hegel would have written if he had lived to revise that part of the Science of Logic? The 1830 logic of essence is not a plausible summary of the 1813 logic of essence. The rearrangements are too extensive. Many of them also show up in the summer 1831 lecture series on the Logic (for instance the splitting up of the form categories and the placement of thing and matter). Hegel finished the revisions of the logic of being just before his death, a few months after the completion of the summer lectures. While the detailed text of the lecture summaries by Hegel's son may not be completely trustworthy, the general order of topics seems reliable, though it's difficult to determine the subordination of the various categories. So there is no historical reason that we should take the 1813 edition of the logic of essence as Hegel's definitive text. The 1830 versions are not classroom summaries of the 1813 text.

Why is Essence so Flexible?

So we are left with versions of the logic of essence that provide different paths through its maze of dualities. In the second half of this paper I want to suggest that there are philosophical reasons why the logic of essence more than the other sections allows multiple arrangements of its materials.

Hegel describes the logic of essence as a criticism of that traditional metaphysics that works with categories of the understanding in fixed oppositions.

Dieser (der schwerste) Teil der Logik enthält vornehmlich die Kategorien der Metaphysik und der Wissenschaften überhaupt; -- als Erzeugnisse der reflektierenden Verstandes, der zugleich die Unterschiede als selbständig annimmt und zugleich auch ihre Relativität setzt; -- beides aber nur neben- oder nacheinander durch ein Auch verbindet und diese Gedanken nicht zusammenbringt, sie nicht zum Begriffe vereint. (E §114z)

This part of the Logic, which is the most difficult one, contains most notably the categories of metaphysics and of the sciences generally; -- it contains them as products of the reflecting understanding, which both assumes the distinctions as independent and at the same time posits their relationality as well. But it only ties the two assumptions together -- and it links the two of them only in contiguity or succession, by means of an "also"; it does not bring these thoughts together; it does unite them into the Concept.

The essence section has, then, two complementary functions. As with the whole logic,
essence is showing a self-developing necessary sequence of categories, and, secondly, it is replacing older categories held apart by the maneuvers of Verstand. To put it another way, the logic of essence is critiquing ordinary language and traditional philosophy's basic categories while also developing their replacements. Critique is to be done by developing the replacements out of the original categories. Recall that in the logic of being's first edition there were many notes dealing with "the customary concepts" of this or that. While the number of notes with that title diminishes later, the logic continues to refer to ordinary language and traditional philosophical concepts in order to critique them. Critique is to be done, says Hegel discussing Spinoza, by first locating the categories to be criticized at their proper place within the self-developing sequence, then showing how they move on their own to more elaborated categories.

But the critical and constructive goals pull against one another in the logic of essence, with the critical function suggesting a different kind of organization than the constructive function. The critical goal can be accomplished in smaller dialectical modules that stand on their own sufficiently that they can be moved around, disturbing the presumed necessity of the constructive goal.

To see this other kind of organization, look at the way similar formulations recur again and again in the logic of essence (and in its summary at the beginning of the logic of the concept). The critical function uses a toolkit that can be applied to concept pairs independently of any necessary sequence. Throughout essence, the same dialectical gestures reoccur as category pairs keep showing the same weaknesses. As Richard points out at the beginning of his paper, in essence the category pairs cannot settle which of the members is to be primary and determining. They lack return into themselves (die Rückkehr in sich (GW 11.375 / LL 163 / SL 535). They have not had their form properly posited (sie hat die Form noch nicht an ihr gesetzt (GW 11.369 / LL 156 / SL 529, the beginning of Actuality). They have only simple self identity (die Form nur die einfache Identität mit sich ist (GW 11.371 / LL 158c / SL 531, the Absolute). Over and over, the two sides of an opposition show that each contains the other and the whole relation. Through double transitions, the categories keep arriving at a new immediate as the Aufhebung of mediation.

Here are some phrases whose movements recur again and again. (See page 3.) Imagine filling in the blanks with different pairs of categories.

Die Wahrheit des _____ ist, daß sie der _____ darin mit sich selbst
sich vereint und somit seine Reflexion in anderes, seine Reflexion in sich selbst ist. (a)

The truth of _____ is that in it _____ is united with itself, so that its reflection into another is its reflection into itself.

Dieses Uebergehen beyder _____ in einander ist ihre unmittelbare Identität. Jedes _____ ist eben durch sein anderes, was es an sich ist, die Totalität des Verhältnisses. Die Bestimmtheit einer _____ ist dadurch, daß sie an ihr die Totalität ist, mit der andern Bestimmtheit vermittelt. (b)

This transition of each _____ into the other is their immediate identity. . . it is precisely through its other that each _____ is what it is in itself, the totality of the relation. Or, conversely, the determinateness of _____, because it is in itself the totality, is mediated with the other determinateness.

Das eine Seite des _____ war zwar der andern gleich, das Ganze so viel als _____, die _____ derselbe Inhalt, als diese selbst, und das _____ überhaupt dasselbe was das _____). Aber zugleich sollten diesen Seiten jede noch ein eigenes unmittelbares Bestehen haben, die _____ als die seyende, die _____ als die reflektierte Unmittelbarkeit. (c)

True, one side of _____ was equal to the other, the _____ was equal to the _____, the _____ the same content as _____ itself, and the _____ altogether the same as the ____. But at the same time, each of these two sides was supposed to have as well an immediate subsistence of its own, _____ as simply affirmative, _____ as reflected immediacy.

Die _____ erhält ihre wahrhafte Bedeutung nur als aufgehobenes _____ ist, und umgekehrt, daß nur das sich aufhebende Gesetztseyn das Gesetztseyn des _____ ist. (d)

The _____ acquires its true meaning . . . the positedness that belongs to _____ is only a sublated positedness, and conversely, only self-sublating positedness is the positedness of _____.

Das _____ is daher so unmittelbar, daß es nur durch das Verschwinden der Vermittlung vermittelt ist. (e)

The _____ is therefore immediate in such a manner that it is mediated only by the vanishing of mediation.

Diese durch _____ vermittelte, und durch das Aufheben der
Vermittlung mit sich identische Unmittelbarkeit ist die _____. (f)
This immediacy that is mediated by _____ and is self-identical through the sublating of mediation, is _____.
Diese _____ muß daher zwar ein Unmittelbares seyn, aber so daß es aus der Aufhebung der Vermittlung sich zum Unmittelbaren gemacht hat. (g)
This _____, though indeed an immediate, must have made itself immediate through the sublation of mediation.
Diß _____ ebensosehr ein Aufheben des _____ ist, oder die _____ nur aus und in ihrem Gesetztseyn zu sich selbst zurückgekommen (h)
This _____ is equally a sublating of _____; in other words, _____ has returned to itself and so become _____, only out of and in its positedness.

My point is that similar dialectical gestures are being made over and over with the categories in essence. These gestures are the "method" of essence. Do those critical gestures need to be coupled with the construction of a single necessary sequence?

In the category pairs, two aspects are kept apart by various maneuvers that make one or the other more fundamental, until there develops a category expressing an identity that is a unity of these two. Then that category in turn develops similar tensions and the process repeats. So, Hegel says that ground (Grund) is the totality of essence, a positing of all its moments (identity, distinction, difference, etc.). He then says the same thing about existence (Existenz) and thing (Ding), as well as about appearance (Erscheinung) and later about actuality (Wirklichkeit). These all posit the moments of reflection (Wesenheiten). All of them advance and decay through plays of identity and distinction and difference, through tensions in self-relation and other-relation and inadequate determination. In the 1816 logic Hegel spells out that play in more detail in the ground chapter. In the 1830 Encyclopedia he moves bits of those descriptions of the play into other places, but they all occur where a positive affirmation of the unity of all of the essence moments is breaking down and showing its internal tensions.

As this same kind of dialectic happens in each of the segments, a given duality reveals its dialectical tensions and completes its critical movement. This produces a module criticizing a traditional concept and providing a reconstructed pair. The critical goal is satisfied. The constructive goal, on the other hand, imposes the further demand that the treatment of one duality produce by determinate negation the new immediacy of a different category pair.
But in Hegel's variants, at least some of the modules get plausibly rearranged to follow one another in different sequences. This flexibility disturbs the goal of purely internal self-construction.

Also, on the reading that demands one single necessary sequence, the pairs thing/matters, form/matter or form/content should not be standardized mediation patterns that can be inserted in different locations. They should find their identity through their location in the sequence. But in fact Hegel treats them as relocatable fragments that make more or less the same points wherever they are inserted. In the pair thing/matters Hegel is criticizing current science and also developing a notion of the unity of the thing. In two versions this discussion occurs in different dialectical contexts, but it remains largely the same internally.

Turning to the Phenomenology for a moment. Many interpreters want to argue that the Phenomenology is a strict necessary sequence leading up to the logic interpreted as pure thought. But when criticizing views that are not expressly treated there, they tend to treat the Phenomenology as using a small number of repeated dialectical patterns, which are then deployed as modularized arguments against more recent epistemological positions. Consider the way William Maker deals with the positions of Davidson, Rorty, et al, by using certain dialectical patterns from the Phenomenology but without putting them into a strict sequence.

I am arguing that the logic of essence works in roughly the same way. There is a consistent set of dialectical patterns applied to category pairs, criticizing them and suggesting more dialectically unified substitutes. At the same time there is the ambition of justifying and strengthening these critiques by putting them into a necessary self-developing order. Because in the essence section the critiques are relatively self-contained, the necessary sequence is less firm.

Also, elsewhere in his system Hegel uses for critiques of everyday and philosophical concepts in politics and art detached pieces of the logical sequence (such as the discussion of form/content, the move from formal to concrete universality, the different kinds of ground, the discussions of identity and difference, the various syllogisms. These dialectical critiques are invoked on many different levels for many different contents, and in using them Hegel feels no need to reproduce their logical sequence in neighboring areas of the Realphilosophie.

**Goals in Tension**

There is another way the critical and constructive goals come into in tension. Look, for instance, at the discussion of the category pair whole and part. This dialectical sequence
occurs (in both editions) at the part of the logic of essence where the sequence is turning
from pairs that divide single entities, through pairs that divide two worlds, to pairs that
describe opposed but seemingly independent entities. The sequence develops the pair whole
and part out of the contrast of the world of appearance and its appearing entities.

Jene Seite, das Ganze, ist die Selbständigkeit, welche die an und für sich seyende Welt ausmachte; die andere Seite, die Theile ist die unmittelbare Existenz, welche die erscheinende Welt war. (GW 11.355 / LL 139 / SL 514)

The first side, the whole, is the self-subsistence which constituted the world in and for itself; the second side, the parts, is the immediate Existence which was the world of Appearance.

So the initial notion of whole applies to the whole world. This makes sense given its location in the sequence. Hegel needs a category of immediate relation between two totalities, and whole/part is a more immediate relation than its successors force/expression and inner/outer.

Hegel's argument about whole/part follows the patterns cited above. To invoke one side is immediately to posit the other.

Das Ganze ist das Selbständige, die Theile sind nur Momente dieser Einheit; aber eben so sehr sind sie auch das Selbständige, und ihre reflectierte Einheit nur ein Moment; und jedes ist in seiner Selbständigkeit schlechthin das Relative eines Andern. (GW 355 / LL 139 / SL 514)

The whole is the self-subsistent, the parts are only moments of this unity; but equally they, too, are the self-subsistent and their reflected unity only a moment; and each is, in its self-subsistence, simply the relative of an other.

Given that the concept pair has been developed from the whole world of appearance and its contents, it is the whole that is first taken as the Grundlage. But besides the sequential development, Hegel means to criticize the Kantian and the empiricist notions of whole/part, as is clear from the Zusatz in the Encyclopedia version. Recall, however, that in empiricism and in Kant, it is declared meaningless or paralogistic to apply whole/part to the entire world of appearance. Ordinary language does apply the concepts that widely, but not by starting with the whole world, rather by generalizing from local wholes. Hegel's notion of the whole does start from the whole world. So the prior sequence has delivered neither the
philosophical nor the ordinary concepts to be criticized, but rather a specialized and reconstructed concept pair.

Hegel's notion of the whole is contrary to long traditions that treat the parts as fundamental, in Atomism, empiricism, as well as in our contemporary mereological studies and reductionisms. Hegel does not argue against these, and his added discussion of the divisibility of matter and the infinite regress of whole/part shows that he does not take seriously the atomist/empiricist strategy for stopping that regress at a factual lowest level. Indeed, in the Encyclopedia Hegel remarks that

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\text{Das mechanische Verhältnis besteht in seiner oberflächlichen Form überhaupt darin, daß die Teile als selbständige gegeneinander und gegen das Ganze sind. (§136z)}
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In its superficial form this is just what the mechanical relationship consists in: that the parts, as independent, stand over against each other and against the whole.

But this is only superficial if you start from a notion of whole/part where the whole is the foundation, already totalized through the prior discussion of the world of appearance. The whole is then favored and not reduced. Those Hegel is criticizing would not agree that

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\text{Diese Andere, die seyende Unmittelbarkeit ist eben so sehr nur als aufgehobene; ihre Selbständigkeit ist ein erstes, aber nur um zu verschwinden, und hat ein Daseyn, das gesetzt und vermittelt ist. (GW 357-58 / LL 142 / SL 517)}
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The other, the simply affirmative immediacy is equally only as sublated; its self-subsistence is a first, but only in order to vanish, and it has an existence that is posited and mediated.

So here we see the demands of the sequence and the demands of criticism conflicting with one another. In this case, as at times elsewhere, Hegel begins the dialectical treatment from an already reconstructed pair of categories, assuming that these will replace the traditional categories (whole/part, form/matter, etc.) without ever dealing with the traditional categories (especially the empiricist categories) directly.

Because the category pair is developed in the sequence at a certain point, it is already a different pair of concepts than those Hegel criticizes in his immediately following note on Kant's antinomies in the Science of Logic and in the Zusatz in the Encyclopedia version. So the critique misfires. To truly criticize and show dialectical problems with the empiricist or
Kantian or atomist notions of whole/part, Hegel would have to start with those notions (as he tries to do with Spinoza), but the sequence demands he start with a notion of whole/part that has already begged the question against the empiricists and atomists.

**A Purer Logic?**

A possible strategy for avoiding this conflict of goals for would be to purge the categorial sequence of all reference to historical and ordinary concepts, leaving the logic a pure self-development without historical examples. Hegel did not do that, but one could imagine trying to do it. The most strict way to attempt it might be to work wholly in terms of the vocabulary that Hegel gathers up in the absolute idea section: immediacy, mediation, determination, indetermination, reflection, position, etc. You would have to stay within that vocabulary because as soon as you used a traditional term such as "whole" or "form" the issue would arise whether you had used it accurately, or if you insisted you were defining it "correctly," what that had to do with the common uses. Imagine rewriting the logic in this fashion. The text might look suspiciously like those attempts to formalize Hegel's logic that use a few operators applied recursively to themselves. Immediate(posed(reflected(indeterminate(immediacy))))) moves to Mediated(posed(reflected(indeterminate(immediacy))))).

Imagine this possible. Imagine it done. What use would such a book be? If you later wanted to do criticism of rival concepts, or had turned to the *Realphilosophie*, to art, to contemporary science, how would you make contact with such an austere logic? Which section would be used to discuss form/content or whole/part or force/expression? How would you know? What if I said matter/form was being discussed in this austere phrasing and you said it was being discussed in this other section? The austere phrasings would be useless since we would not know how or where to apply them on their own. More is needed than the austere metavocabulary, but how much more? The historical illustrations give the logic critical grip and usefulness. If the historical concepts were not named and woven into the development, they could only be inserted rather arbitrarily, or at best by controversial decisions. In the essence section, because the traditional concepts being criticized have no standard order one to another, they provide a set of detachable modules of criticism that slip about when aligned into a single sequence.

There is another reason to want the historical-critical and the constructive to be closely entwined. Hegel wishes the standard philosophical dualities to be absorbed into the development so that they cannot then be used against his overarching notions of spirit and idea. These final notions are not to be attacked in terms of form/content or cause/effect or
other standard philosophical critical tools. This is a noble goal, but Hegel's final unities are still routinely attacked using dualities he would insist have already been removed from the discussion. To feel the bite of this critique, though, the opponent would have had to accept the redescriptions of her position and categories. But why should she accept them? As far as she can see the Hegelian critique is changing the subject, telling her that she must be using concepts that in fact she is not using. One could argue that this is because the opponents have not submitted themselves to the disciplined enlightenment provided by the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*, but this elite reply begs the question again by presupposing that the dualities dealt with in those books are the same as the ones the critics use.

**Conclusion**

To sum up, the philosophical reasons behind the greater variability of the essence section are that it works with a set of dialectical moves applied to different category pairs, which complete their critical function within relatively independent modules that can be moved around, because they have no external or traditional order and no clear and unique relations of determinate negation. So the critical arguments can appear in varying constructive sequences.

It is the critical operation of the logic of essence that is appealed to by Hegel later on in his system, and the critically reconstructed categories are what are most useful in art and politics today. It is true that without a unique, firm scientific sequence these reconstructed categories lose the claim to automatic supremacy, but that claim has always been shaky unless based on metaphysical presuppositions. The individual criticisms and constructive suggestions are important, not as *a priori* criticisms to be applied from on high, but as useful and perhaps persuasive within the local problematic being discussed, where they have to pay local dues since they have no universal ticket of validity.
Appendix: Sources of the pattern sentences:

(a) Die Wahrheit des Begründens ist, daß der Grund darin mit sich selbst sich vereint und somit seine Reflexion in anderes, seine Reflexion in sich selbst ist. (GW 11.322 / LL 100 / SL 478) (at the conclusion of Ground)

The truth of grounding is that in it ground is united with itself, so that its reflection into another is its reflection into itself.

(b) Dieses Uebergehen beyder in einander ist ihre unmittelbare Identität, als Grundlage; aber es ist auch ihre vermittelte Identität; nemlich jedes ist eben durch sein Anderes, was es an sich ist, die Totalität des Verhältnisses. Oder umgekehrt die Bestimmtheit einer jeden Seite ist dadurch, daß sie an ihr die Totalität ist, mit der anderen Bestimmtheit vermittelt; die Totalität vermittelt sich so durch die Form oder die Bestimmtheit mit sich selbst, und die Bestimmtheit vermittelt sich durch ihre einfache Identität mit sich. (GW 11.368 / LL 155 / SL 528) (at the conclusion of Essential Relation)

This transition of each into the other is their immediate identity as substrate; but it is also their mediated identity; for it is precisely through its other that each is what it is in itself, the totality of the relation. Or, conversely, the determinateness of each side, because it is in itself the totality, is mediated with the other determinateness; thus the totality mediates itself with itself through the form or determinateness, and the determinateness is mediated with itself through its simple identity.

(c) Die eine Seite des wesentlichen Verhältnisses war zwar der anderen gleich; das Ganze soviel als die Theile, die Aeußerung der Kraft derselbe Inhalt, als diese selbst, und das Aeußere überhaupt dasselbe, was das Innere. Aber zugleich sollten diese Seiten jede noch ein eigenes unmittelbares Bestehen haben, die eine als die seyende, die andere als die reflectierte Unmittelbarkeit. (GW 11.373 / LL 161 / SL 533) (The Absolute Attribute)

True, one side of the relation was equal to the other, the whole was equal to the parts, the expression of force the same content as force itself, and the outer altogether the same as the inner. But at the same time, each of these two sides was supposed to have as well an immediate subsistence of its own, one as simply affirmative, the other as reflected immediacy.

(d) Der Grund ist daher selbst eine der Reflexionsbestimmungen des Wesens, aber die letzte, vielmehr nur die Bestimmung, daß sie aufgehobene Bestimmung ist. Die Reflexionsbestimmung, indem sie zugrunde geht, erhält ihre wahrhafte Bedeutung, der absolute Gegenstoß ihrer in sich selbst zu seyn, nemlich daß das Gesetzteyn, das dem
Wesen zukommt, nur als aufgehobenes Gesetztseyn ist, und umgekehrt, daß nur das sich aufhebende Gesetztseyn das Gesetztseyn des Wesens ist. (GW 11.291 / LL 63 / SL 444) (at the beginning of Ground)

Consequently, ground is itself one of the reflected determinations of essence; but it is the last of them, or rather the meaning of this determination is merely that it is a sublated determination. The reflected determination, in falling to the ground, acquires its true meaning, namely, to be within itself the absolute recoil upon itself, that is to say, the positedness that belongs to essence is only a sublated positedness, and conversely, only self-sublating positedness is the positedness of essence.

(e) Das Hervortreten in die Existenz is daher so unmittelbar, daß es nur durch das Verschwinden der Vermittlung vermittelt ist. (GW 11.321 / LL 100 / SL 477) (at the conclusion of Ground)

The emergence into Existence is therefore immediate in such a manner that it is mediated only by the vanishing of mediation.

(f) Diese durch Geund und Bedingung vermittelte, und durch das Aufheben der Vermittlung mit sich identische Unmittelbarkeit ist die Existenz. (GW 11.322 / LL 100 / SL 478) (at the conclusion of Ground)

This immediacy that is mediated by ground and condition and is self-identical through the sublating of mediation, is Existence.

(g) Diese muß daher zwar ein Unmittelbares seyn, aber so daß es aus der Aufhebung der Vermittlung sich zum Unmittelbaren gemacht hat. (GW 12.11 / LL 213 / SL 577) (The Notion in General)

This foundation, though indeed an immediate, must have made itself immediate through the sublation of mediation.

(h) Diß Setzen ebensosehr ein Aufheben des Vorausgesetzten ist, oder die die absolute Substanz nur aus und in ihrem Gesetztseyn zu sich selbst zurückgekommen (GW 12.13 / LL 216 / SL 579) (The Notion in General)

This positing is equally a sublating of what was presupposed; in other words, absolute substance has returned to itself and so become absolute, only out of and in its positedness.
References


I'm establishing the parameters for a defense, not defending

showing a way of reading/using Essence not so pure or foundational

concede imp on its own but say args from first paper,

no on its own, language, (ref pres addr)

crit for deciding rival narrs,

really try to construct rival narrs, (or else making intuitive decisions?)

and hgrn psp. not of ee but of goal and nature/meaning of being.

the doubter