On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge*

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Editor's Introduction

As well as its intrinsic interest as an argument against psychologism and what has come to be called "the myth of the given," the essay translated here possesses considerable historical significance both for itself and as a representative of its school. Husserl cites this particular essay as having helped stimulate his thoughts against psychologism. Natorp's resolute defense of transcendental analysis grounding empirical and psychological science helped Natorp's Allgemeine Psychologie towards admitting the pure transcendental ego. Read with Husserl in mind this essay shows the Kantian as well as Platonic roots of Husserl's noemata. There is little here to parallel Husserl's noetic analyses, though Natorp himself moves a bit in that direction in his more Fichtean and Hegelian later writings.

The essay is directly aimed at the classic positivists. Read with them in mind the essay reveals how closely the participants in turn-of-the-century debates agreed on the basic options available. Not surprisingly, the attack on psychologism seems prophetic of the similar attack made by the Logical Positivists, as a substitution of "logical form" or "linguistic rules" for Natorp's 'objective unities' will show. But the real parallel to Natorp in the analytic tradition comes later. His position, with its renunciation of immediate givenness in favor of the ongoing process of knowing from which both pure subjectivity and pure objectivity are limiting abstract cases, resembles the anti-positivist views of Quine and Wilfrid Sellars. Natorp shares with both of them a reliance on the sciences for our premium representations of the world. Natorp's theory remains true to idealism, however, in his refusal to develop a theory of reference outside of the constitution of objects within the process of knowing. (Though just how far this "idealism" differs from some current linguistic-framework theories could be a matter for debate.)

Natorp's Kantian scientism brought reactions. Indeed, just as today we find writers such as Richard Rorty accepting the negative polemics of Quine and Sellars while refusing the pre-eminence of science, so Natorp's pupil Ernst Cassirer accepted Natorp's attack on positivism but discarded the emphasis on science and arrived at a general theory of symbol and culture with historicist and Hegelian leanings.

A stronger reaction against the Neo-Kantian approach is found, of course, in Martin Heidegger, who studied under Heinrich Rickert, a leader of the Heidelberg wing of Neo-Kantianism, which was not as oriented to the sciences as the Marburg school. Heidegger later taught at Marburg, arriving the year before Natorp's death. Being and Time becomes clearer in both its project and its polemics, when placed alongside Natorp's search for grounds and foundations, his
discussions of an original transcendental relation to objectivity, and his insistence that there is no other way we are present with things than through finding objective laws for the manifold of appearance. In these and other features the present essay helps us see some of the contemporary targets Heidegger had in mind when he attacked "metaphysics." 5

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Paul Natorp was born in Düsseldorf in 1854. He studied philology at Bonn and Strassburg, seeking the general form behind mythology and religion, then transferred to Marburg, attracted by the systematic clarity of Herman Cohen's interpretation of Kant, which seemed to offer a scientific understanding of culture and knowledge. He held the chair of philosophy at Marburg jointly with Cohen from 1885 until 1912, and continued a professor at Marburg until his death in 1924. His students included Ernst Cassirer and Nicolai Hartmann. Natorp wrote extensively on the theory of knowledge, social ethics, and the theory of education. He may be best known in English speaking circles for his interpretation of Plato; his systematic works have not been translated. 6

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1.

Each separate science or theory seeks laws for a limited and determined range of appearances. Science, theoretical knowledge (Erkenntnis) considered as a whole and as a unity, seeks to unfold a unified network of laws, into which all particular laws for given appearances must fit. Logic, the theory of knowledge, aims at displaying how knowledge forms an inner unity through a process of composition according to laws. 7

This unity of knowledge is not ensured by the simple lack of inner contradiction and by the consistent connection of thoughts which is called, in a limited sense, the "form" of true knowledge (what Kant called the negative criterion of knowledge). The inner unity of knowledge must concern the object (Gegenstand) or, to be more exact, the universal relation of knowledge to the object. 8

Gradual concensus on this might be attained among scholars. We are taking a position basically not far from that of Kant; indeed we accentuate the essence of his view if we deny that an exclusively "formal" logic can serve as an adequate theory of knowledge and not merely as a technique. According to Kant, there are no laws of purely formal truth which do not have their roots in laws of objective truth. There is therefore no formal logic which is not grounded in "transcendental" logic. If both are related in the same way as the lawgiving found in the analytic and synthetic functions, and if all analysis presupposes synthesis (because the understanding cannot analyze anything which it has placed synthesized) then everything which formal logic can teach must be able to be grounded transcendently.

We hold that it was settled a long time ago just how it is possible to have a theory of objective truth, a legislation of the laws of knowledge,
through which the relation of truth and knowledge to the object is originally determined with universal validity. We do not need to settle this matter for the first time here.⁹

If we regard knowledge as a task similar to an equation to be solved, then the object is the sought-for, not yet determined X which can only be determined through the data. This X, however, is not totally unknown; just as the X in the equation is itself determined in its significance (Bedeutung) by its expressed relation to the known quantities.¹⁰ Even before solving the equation of knowledge the significance of the object must be determined by its determinate relation to the data for knowledge. Otherwise, the task of knowing the object would be not only unsolvable but incomprehensible. Thus it is necessary that knowledge have an original relation to the object if even the question concerning the object and the demand for knowledge to agree with the object are to have a specifiable meaning. And indeed, as the universal meaning (Sinn) of the X is predetermined by the form of the equation, in the same way the universal meaning of the object will be predetermined by that which we call the “form” of knowledge.¹¹ From this it is already clear that the real form of knowledge must refer to its relationship to the object and not be sought in abstraction from all objects and all relations to them. Even Kant, whose authority it is popular to claim in favor of a merely “formal” logic (in the latter sense), demanded for “pure” logic abstraction not from all relation to the object, but only from specific relation to particular objects. Clearly the first abstraction would be unworkable if we are still to speak of knowledge at all. We may indicate this second claim, too, as one on which all competent scholars concur.

Finally, we are not seeking the general nature of the relationship between the sought-for object and the data of knowledge. This has already been decided, since what is being sought is the object, the “being” (Sein) which is the ground that corresponds to the “appearance”. Anyone who has asked about an object will have known what the question seeks.

The data of knowledge are “phenomena” in the most general sense: those appearances which are to be explained (erklären) by science, that is, are to be traced back to the truth (Wahrheit) which appears in them. The object should be the object for the appearance; the appearance should be proven to be the appearance of the object. Here there is already expressed an original relation of the object to what is given in knowledge which is analogous to the relation of the X to the known quantities of the equation. The meaning of this relation must be discoverable through analyzing what the questioner about the object intends, seeks, and since he seeks, presupposes. If every science inquires after the objective foundation underlying each appearance of its truth, then every science must have some concept of this foundation and of the grounding relationship of the object to the appearance.

All scientific knowledge aims at the law. The relation of the appear-
ance to the law (the relation of the "manifold" of the appearance to the "unity" of the law) must therefore explain the original relation to the object in all knowledge. The interpretation of the appearance in accordance with laws is taken as the objectively true interpretation.

We may take as impartially established this universal correlation between law and object, ancient as it is in the history of philosophy and the sciences. It has been established not through the whim or the passion for system of this or that philosopher, but rather through the action of science that everywhere constitutes the object in law.

Given these fundamentals we can confidently take a stand on the pending problems of logic. Whoever cannot agree with us on this common basis will probably find most of the following said in vain. And yet these conclusions are merely preliminary. Only beyond them do the really difficult questions of logic arise, the first and most vital of which will be discussed here: the question of logical method, which may be formulated for the present as follows: must that foundation which logic is to give knowledge be achieved by objective or subjective methods?

2.

The expressions "objective" and "subjective" of course refer to the object and the subject of knowledge. The law of the objectivity of knowledge must be sought, and sought in knowledge itself. Knowledge, however, shows itself from the start as two-sided: as "content" (as what is known or to be known) and as "activity" (Tätigkeit) or experience (Erlebnis) of the subject (as knowing). To be sure, in every knowing both relations are present together and closely connected; there can no more be a known without a knower than there can be a knower without a known. But in the abstract both must be differentiated, and clearly a theory which grounds knowledge in its own laws can only refer immediately to one of the two relations. Consequently, we must ask which of the two should be regarded as first, underlying, and determining in the grounding of knowledge. Must the law of objectivity lie exclusively in the contents of knowledge which are to be related to the object? Must the law be proved from these without taking any account of the relation to the subject? Or is it perhaps in precisely this relationship to the subject that the foundation of the laws of objectivity must be originally sought? In this case it would be only secondary, in as far as the content of knowledge is somehow affected, that the ground could be recognized in the content.

We must confess that at first the latter interpretation appears convincing. It can easily appear as if one were explaining the same by the same when one grounds the objectivity of knowledge by a relationship already originally present in the content of knowledge; it appears to be a far more basic explanation which turns to the subject which after all pronounces itself as the underlying ground by its very name. Thus many take as established that the true grounding of knowledge is to be sought in
relationship to the subject, in subjective "consciousness".

We will not here examine the historical reasons why this view has become rooted so deeply in contemporary philosophy. Clearly it has been the influence of Kant which had the main impact on this stream of thought, at least in Germany. Kant appears to seek at least the most fundamental laws and conditions for the objective truth of knowledge in the laws of our subjectivity — the laws of our senses and our understanding. To what extent this interpretation of Kant is correct can remain undecided for now; it is more important to know what considerations of content serve as apparent supports for the subjective viewpoint.

Knowledge is in every case an occurrence in the context of subjective experience, an event in consciousness, a psychic encounter. As such, it is naturally grasped and treated scientifically in the context of the whole subjective life of consciousness. Lawfulness in knowledge thus appears to be a necessary result of laws for psychic life. If "objective" validity is to be ascribed to knowledge at all, then since this validity is an attribute of knowledge it must somehow be grounded in the subjectivity of knowledge. It must have its roots in the activity or the subjective experience of knowing. The "act" of knowing seems as if it must be first, while knowledge, regarded as content, seems the dependent result or product. The product must be called objective; the manufacture is subjective. To be sure, according to this view, logic becomes unavoidably dependent on psychology, which conclusion at least the most consistent advocates of the subjective viewpoint have not shied away from. Kant, of course, from whom they come historically, took the opposite stand with unequivocal firmness on precisely this point; but even some of his first otherwise faithful disciples, such as Fries, believed it necessary to correct him here and to trace transcendental philosophy back to its true psychological foundation.

On the other hand it is easy to see that our preliminary conclusions point much more to the opposing position.

In order to ascertain the general relation of knowledge and its object we regarded knowledge as an equation to be solved; that is, we considered it purely in terms of its objective content. We believed that we could answer in advance the question of the meaning and ground of objectivity using only that content which knowledge supposes when it confronts the object as that which is to be known. In this connection there was no mention of knowledge as activity or experience, or of the knower as subject. To be sure, we readily conceded that there could be no "known" without a "knower," that knowledge is only given in the experience of a subject, in the consciousness of the knower. But as this relation to the subject is not the point in question, it is not necessary for us to turn to this in answering the question. Each appeal to the subject of knowledge and the way in which consciousness participates in knowledge must on the contrary appear to us from the start as a category mistake (metabasis eis allo genos).
We can easily remove the appearance of explaining the same by the same in seeking the ground of objectivity purely on the objective side of knowledge. What grounds something not only must not, it can not belong to another genus than what is grounded. It is usually said that the mere reduction to law does not really explain a phenomenon, since after all it simply repeats the given state of affairs in a universal expression. Whoever says this must be understanding something very obscure by explanation. The universal expression leading a particular incident back to a universal pattern of occurrences contains just what has always been understood by explanation. The synthetic connection of the unlimited manifold of appearances in the unity of law, the bringing into unity (syllebein eis hen), as Plato says (Theaetetus 147D), is what makes the phenomenon understandable and so explains it. The essential point on which all depends is that the explaining ground can never be in any other relationship to that which is explained by it than that of universal to particular, of law and recognized instance of the law. The central force which helps to determine the movement of the planets is explained by gravity because it is shown to be an instance of the latter and connected by the same law with known instances. This is the common pattern. Accordingly, the ground of the law of the objective relation can only be sought in the connection together (Zusammenhang) of what is related as content to objects, i.e. in the universal features of this relation. It is impossible to find the ground in the quite other, more or less opposed relation of knowledge to the knower. However, every objective relation which occurs can also be expressed in a subjective relation. Through an expression which subjectifies the objective, the appearance may arise (as it did in Kant's case) that subjectivity actually contains the ground of the objective relation.

All this gives a positive and direct solution to our question. Perhaps for those who have already thought through the relationship of the objective and subjective aspects of knowledge it needs no further comment. Yet this relationship, clear in itself, has become so confused by the dispute over Kant's legacy and the ensuing dissipation of this inheritance, that a more probing discussion does not seem unnecessary. On principle, we will not take into account the dispute over what Kant really taught and what position should be taken in regard to his doctrine. This has by now become unedifying; we will make some remarks on Kant's position on the question only after we have decided the matter on the basis of its content and aside from any historical considerations.

3.

One consideration above all renders the subjectivist point of view unacceptable: if, as this point of view demands, one makes logic in principle dependent on a particular science, namely psychology, one negates the whole meaning of logic as a universal theory grounding the truth of knowledge. However much contention may exist about the
precise limits and methods of a universal science of knowledge, this much at least should be agreed on by all who believe in the possibility of such a science; it must be a science of a more fundamental validity (Geltung) than any other. A science which according to its name and claim treats knowledge in general and its laws may not be dependent for its own grounding upon any particular scientific knowledge (which of course can only be called valid according to logic's laws). The science of knowledge must be the ground of all particular sciences. If logic treats the criterion of truth, if it treats that which determines the truth of an act of knowledge according to laws and so universally, then the validity of this criterion cannot be dependent on an act of knowledge which can only be asserted as true according to this criterion. Thus there is either no logic at all, or it must be able to make the claim of building entirely on its own ground without borrowing its foundation from any other science.

But it is possible that this claim cannot be upheld. At least, anyone who without hesitation makes logic a branch of psychology obviously sees things differently. For him, psychology is the basic science and logic is at best its application.

The possibility of this objection forces us to go yet a step further. We claim that not only the meaning of logic, but the meaning of all objective science is mistaken and almost turned into its opposite if one makes the objective truth of knowledge dependent on subjective experience. One not only destroys logic, as the independent theory of the objective validity of knowledge, one also cancels out objective validity itself and changes it into purely subjective validity if one attempts to support it on subjective grounds and to deduce it from subjective factors. Because of this we believe we stand not only for the rights of logic, according to its hitherto accepted concept, but also for the claim of all science to objective validity for its truths, when we maintain that objective validity must be founded objectively.

In fact, all science which makes a claim to objectivity starts from the presupposition that with regard to the validity of its truth-claims it must not be dependent on any other laws than those which can be made certain within the science, in that inner connection (Zusammenhang) to be developed in logical form, independent of any further assumptions which might be dragged in. Knowledge is only to be grounded through other knowledge, namely by logical mediation in a network (Zusammenhang) thought as a unity and determined by the one lawful system of Science or Knowledge. In particular, any appeal to the subject and its powers is in itself completely alien to subjective science. The objectivity to which science makes claim unquestionably means a validity which truly overcomes the subjectivity of consciousness and not merely appears to. In the object, in the matter (Sache) which is asserted as true, should lie that which makes up the truth of knowledge, completely independent of the givenness of a suitable representation (Vorstellung) as a subjective experience of this or that consciousness. Of course, the consciousness of
truth in sciences such as mathematics and the mathematical natural sciences (to remain with those which pride themselves on the strongest grounding of their propositions) is completely independent of the understanding of forces or functions through which this truth in its subjective possibility becomes a comprehensible possession of the psyche. We become certain of the truth within the proper internal network of the science, developed from primary objective content assumptions as they are formulated in the basic concepts and propositions of that science. Thus science not only makes its claim, it also justifies in action its claim to a thoroughly autonomous validity and grounding, since it lays bare its objective foundation in the form of basic concepts and principles. The mathematician or physicist who truly grasps the nature of his science will find it superfluous to seek the grounds for the laws of truth for his knowledge in psychology. He will in principle deny such a search; he recognizes only the laws of his own science, not an alien science, as the judge of truth.

The theory of truth will also have to stand opposed to psychology in just the same way, independent in the same sense as the truth of scientific knowledge itself. For the theory of truth aims at nothing other than comprehending and making certain within the unified network of Science just that autonomous legislation of objective truth which the sciences, each in their limited field, claim as the basis of their authority. Thus each science must proceed from basic concepts and principles, not subjective acts. We thus insist that the autonomous, purely objective grounding of truth which we demand is necessary to give fully serious meaning to logic, to truth, and to the objective validity of scientific knowledge.

However, our argument, even in this expanded and intensified formulation, still seems to support itself on a mere claim or postulate (although now of all objective science and not only logic). Perhaps there is one firm defender of the subjectivist view who will take it upon himself to dispute the correctness of this claim to objectivity, not only of logic but of all science which calls itself objective. We could perhaps claim it as a victory to see our enemy forced into this extreme position. And yet, we do not want to have merely argued ad hominem. Therefore we will attempt to delve deeper into the core of the problem and show how the desired purely objective grounding of knowledge can be carried out according to its law, and at which point the attempted subjective grounding fails (and perhaps failed long ago). Thus we now have to confront the two standpoints in more detail, in order to decide through experiment the feasibility of the one and the unfeasibility of the other.

4.

Objective validity signifies a validity independent of the subjectivity of knowledge — this is well established. What is to be objectively valid, is to be valid apart from the givenness of its representation in this or that
consciousness. The question is what this non-subjective validity, so far merely defined negatively, signifies positively, and how it can be grounded.

It appears that only one of two answers is possible. Objects in themselves are there, outside and independent of all subjectivity, without any original relation to it. Of course, they are represented only through subjective representation, but the representation only stands for (represents or signifies) the object, it is not the object itself. Thus objectivity is not negated by subjectivity. That is the first answer.

Perhaps this actually means something correct, but at least as it is presented, it is not really an answer to the question. The being-in-itself of the object is itself an enigma (Rätsel) and thus cannot serve as a solution to our present enigma. If we understood what it meant to say the object in itself is there independent of all subjectivity and then is appropriated in our subjectivity by knowledge there would be no problem in the knowing of objects or in the objectivity of knowledge.

Thus one is naturally led to seek the solution in the opposite direction. Rather than starting from the object and proceeding to make subjective knowing understandable in relation to the object, which after all is not given but is in question, one must first take the standpoint of knowledge and ask how knowledge itself understands objectivity, how knowledge goes about confronting the object as independent of the subjectivity of knowing, and what objectivity signifies for knowledge. Obviously this way promises to lead more quickly to our goal. No object is given to us in any other way than in knowledge. Thus the meaning and ground of objectivity are not available for comprehension in any other way. To begin with, “object” signifies that which knowledge stands over against. The meaning and ground of this confrontation can best be communicated by knowledge itself. For it is precisely knowledge’s business to proceed with consciousness, to know what it does and why. To question this consciousness of knowledge about its own activity was the direction indicated by our first considerations; this was the opinion of Kant when, after many promising attempts by his predecessors, he made the demand to prove the conditions and laws of objectivity out of consciousness, that is, out of the consciousness of science.

But by this, objectivity seems more threatened than ever, in that the object seems to be determined only from the viewpoint of knowledge and thus of subjectivity. Knowledge itself confronts the object almost on its own authority, obeying only its own laws; it demands, in Kant’s curt description, that the object should conform to knowledge, and not vice versa. Knowledge — isn’t that subjectivity?

However, it has been said that knowledge confronts the object as independent of the subjectivity of knowing. Obviously the pivotal point of the problem is how to understand and ground this independence.

It will be clear from the outset that it can only be understood by means of an abstraction. Objects are really only given to us in the
knowledge which we have of them. Yet if even in this knowledge the object is regarded as independent of the subjectivity of knowing, this cannot be understood unless one abstracts from subjectivity, from the relation of the represented to the representor, and from the content of his subjective experience. That this abstraction in itself is possible needs no proof. It is actually carried out in all sciences, in that they claim to know "the object"; and it is carried out in a naïve way in common representation which seeks to encounter "things" and believes that it does. Perhaps this abstraction which is carried out naturally also explains that first attempt at an answer which we rejected in its initial form; the in-itself-ness of the object can only mean the abstraction from subjectivity, an abstraction whose authority and necessity are regarded just as quite self-evident and in no need of grounding. In fact, this abstraction is carried out without any reflection whatsoever; thus the object appears to be present and given from the outset, and not first reached through abstraction. If one thinks back on its relationship to knowledge, the illusion arises that the object, present (vorhanden) and given from the beginning, subsequently comes to our subjectivity in a new relation alien to itself — to be known. Actually the object is not first there with subjectivity coming later. It is only that in natural consciousness reflection on the object is thoroughly primary and immediate; reflection on subjectivity, if it happens at all, is secondary.

However, the mere possibility of the abstraction from subjectivity, proved by its actual performance, cannot also ground its authority and necessity. The possibility explains the significance of the claim to objective validity but has not yet proven this claim to possess any legitimacy. The question thus advances to a new stage: what are the grounds which determine why the abstraction from subjectivity which gives us the knowledge we call objective is not only possible but necessary?

In order to clarify the content of this question, one must recall the meaning of any valid abstraction. I believe when one understands abstraction as merely negative, one’s explanation is, if not completely off the mark, at least starting badly and doomed to failure. To consider abstraction negatively is to consider it logically as the removal of a characteristic, psychologically as disregard, turning away from or removing the mental view from a particular aspect actually contained in the representation. This explanation is insufficient as long as it fails to mention the positive aspects for whose sake and advantage one must disregard other aspects as not pertinent. For the positive is the determining point, the other merely its consequence. When I focus my attention on one particular thing, I automatically exclude from the present examination whatever has no part in the unity of this view (Betrachtung). Characterized psychologically, what is primary is the concentration of the mental eye, logically, the unity of determination; the other is merely the reverse side of the matter, not the matter itself. Thus geometric concepts (point, straight line, etc.) abstract from deviations and non-uniform aspects in the per-
ception of the senses when they fix the mind’s eye on what is uniform, unified, and unchangeably determined.

If we apply this to our case, our question is immediately made more precise. As long as the abstraction from subjectivity demanded in the concept of the object is seen merely in its negative meaning, it is understandable that the overcoming of subjectivity seems an empty fiction which can scarcely be maintained in actual life. It seemed thus to the modern sensualists, who so far were not entirely wrong. If one strips everything from the object which is merely given in subjective representation — and that seems to be the meaning of the demanded abstraction as long as one understands it only negatively — then of course nothing whatever remains except that unnameable something, that "something, I know not what" which has haunted sensualist philosophy for a long time. Abstraction from subjectivity, understood only negatively, can certainly ground no being (Sein); at most, it could only ground the fiction of being. But because of this more effort should have been made to go beyond sterile negation and investigate whether the desired abstraction did not perhaps have some positive content in reserve. The positive character, of which the disregard for subjectivity is merely the result, could ground a type of being which is not merely a fiction.

What the object signifies positively has already been stated, at least in general terms. Taken positively, the object signifies the law; it signifies the lasting unity in which the changing manifold of appearance is unified and determined in thought. This significance of the object, of "being" differentiated from "appearing", has been won for philosophy since Plato, or perhaps since the Eleatics. This meaning of objectivity is the whole rationalist direction in philosophy which, I would say, stands secure because of the concept of reason (ratio) since reason ultimately means law, and nothing else. But science too strives at least since Galileo to make this sense of "object" true. The objectification of appearance is carried out in the reduction to law; there is no other way. In this, the autonomy which science claims is guaranteed. When the appearance is reduced to law then the appearance is reduced to the object appearing in it. The appearance of the daily movement of the sun around the earth signifies objectively the daily movement of the earth on its axis, since according to this representation of the object which is the ground of the appearance, the given appearance is explained by its connection (Zusammenhang) with other known laws. On the other hand, that representation which accepts the object according to direct sensual appearance frustrates the reduction to law and thus cannot have objective validity. Also, whoever seeks what is objectively good and just as distinguished from what passes for such with any particular subject, whoever in addition, like Adeimantos in Plato’s Republic, searches for that which does not merely appear, but is, such a person also believes in and seeks a law of the good, of the just. He seeks the harmonious view of these unique "objects" in which all change and contradiction of subjective opinion is overcome.
He seeks the "steady pole in the flood of appearances" and strives "to make fast with lasting thought that which floats in varying appearance".

Thus, if it is in general the law which gives the concept of the object its positive significance, then the solution to our problem must be sought by asking how the concept of law makes abstraction from subjectivity not only possible but necessary.

5.

The answer to this will be found in the most direct way if we first succeed in understanding the meaning of that subjectivity which must be overcome in the representation of the object.

Subjectivity signifies the relationship of the represented to the representor, in so far as it is represented by him, that is, in so far as it forms the content of his subjective experience. Subjectivity signifies the immediate relationship to the ego.

What is given in immediate relationship to the ego is finally nothing other than what in relationship to the object is called the appearance. Multiform and constantly changing, presenting itself now this way now that, this appearance is to be related back to the unified basic form of the object appearing in it. The appearance is multiform and changing precisely for the multiple and changing states of subjects. The ultimate immediate appearance, however, the phenomenon of ultimate authority, is nothing other than what is given on each occasion to a determined subject in a determined situation. It is this which we must name as what is ultimately subjective; there is absolutely nothing else by which the concept of subjectivity could be positively determined, aside from the appearing, the phainesthai itself, which, as Hobbes had already stated, is both the most noteworthy and the most original of all "phenomena".15

If this is established, then it is immediately clear how far subjectivity is overcome in the concept of the law. The function of law in knowledge is just this: confronting the appearance which from the outset presents itself not in an identical, unified, determined manner but rather varying according to the subject and its situation, the law is to ground that representation of the object which is unanimously valid for all subjects in all circumstances. However, just as the lawful interpretation of the object represents that which is objectively valid, even so the appearance, before the reduction to law and thus to the object, is the most concrete expression of subjectivity. Appearance is the representation which is not yet objectified in law and consequently is still subjective, just as an objective representation is one which has been raised to law and brought to the standpoint of universal validity and to unity.

That this concept of subjectivity is the only tenable one should be proven in more detail in another place. Yet it should be immediately evident that for judging the relationship of subjective and objective absolutely nothing else is given to us except knowledge, in which we
differentiate the subjective and objective sides, the appearing as such (or the direct givenness of the appearance in the experience of consciousness) and the reduction to law (the objectification of appearance). 16

Yet it may be useful to make a distinction here without which this relationship of subjective and objective, though clear in itself, may easily become confused.

We distinguish two types or stages of objectification. A certain objectification is already present in the simple differentiation of the "content" of a representation from representing as an "activity" (or better, "experience") of the subject. The content abstracted from the activity already signifies not merely that which is represented and thought by someone or other at this time, but also that which is representable or thinkable in the same way by anyone at any time. Raising what has been represented one single time to what is to be universally so represented already signifies a rise to the standpoint of the universal, namely universal validity and thus objectivity. Just as at this first level the opposition of subjective and objective rests on a relationship of particular and universal, this same relationship also controls every further objectification.

What the sciences call a "phenomenon," the appearance which is to be explained, i.e. reduced to law, is in general not what is ultimately subjective, what we called "the phenomenon of ultimate authority". Instead it is always already somehow raised to objective significance. It is not regarded as being represented merely once by one individual, but rather as something to be so represented universally by every individual. Thus it has already undergone the first objectification, the raising of the single represented to universal validity. The scientific phenomenon itself must for the most part be first established by scientific means before it can serve as the basis for other more general proofs. To establish (constatieren) a fact means to prove it something to be universally recognized, verifiable by everyone at all times. A fact is "established" (festgestellt) when it is unambiguously determined in confrontation with the multiformity and thus the indetermination of the original and direct appearance. One can also easily see that such determination is always possible only from the universal standpoint and according to universal measures. Thus it is through an objectifying act that science arrives at the particular "fact" which as "phenomenon" grounds science. If it was said earlier that the data of knowledge, in the most general understanding, were "phénomena", then we must add the reminder that what we usually call phenomena are not the first data. The first data would be what is given in the absolutely particular act of consciousness.

Yet what is already somewhat objectified in the way just described has the same relationship to each representation of a particular subject (the universal to the particular) as that universal which we call the law has to the particular state of affairs or phenomenon which has already been established as universally valid. It is the same function of knowledge by which the single represented is raised to something which is to be univer-
sally represented and by which the single universally valid state of affairs is raised to the universality of law. These are merely two internally connected stages of one and the same process of objectification, which can be expressed by a two-fold relationship of particular and universal.

With them the relationship of subjective and objective in knowledge can be explained completely by the relationship of the particular and the universal.

With this reduction we seem to be led more than ever into the darkest abyss of metaphysics. The significance of the universal and particular in knowledge has certainly been the key point in metaphysical disputes since antiquity. Yet we believe that today the ancient question can be answered simply and precisely, and it will be seen that its answer will with one stroke reveal the solution to our problem.

6.

The dispute over the primacy of the particular or the universal lies at the root of the opposition between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. This dispute renewed itself in the medieval debate between realism and nominalism and has exerted a deep influence on recent and contemporary philosophy. If we see philosophy today divided into two enemy camps by the opposition between positivism and idealism, we can easily perceive that the ultimate basis of the division lies in the question of the primacy of the particular or the universal. This is not to say that philosophy has made no essential progress in all this time. On the contrary, when one compares today's prevailing opposed principles with those of Aristotle a double difference and progression appears.

First of all, with Aristotle and even with the medieval scholastics, it was essentially a question of the particular thing, or individual, and the universal of the thing, or species. More recent philosophy, in as far as the vast reform of the sciences since the start of modern times has not left it unaffected, knows the universal essentially and originally under the form of law. The thing is no longer the primary given, but rather first an unknown. As Kant concisely summed up the basic result of modern science since Galileo, things have dissolved into mere "relationships", although among these there are some which are "independent and constant" and which from now on must represent things for us. From now on it is primarily and essentially a matter of the universality of relation (which gives the concept of law).

As important and revolutionary as is this alteration of the problem, a second change is still more important for our present investigation. Today the question of the particular and the universal no longer concerns merely the relationship of the particular thing, particular occurrence, or particular instance of a relation to the universal of this thing, this occurrence, or this relation. It concerns at bottom the relationship of the final, absolutely particular subjective representation or appearance to that
which has somehow already been raised to universal and so objective significance. Thus it is correct, as we established, that the ultimate particular is the absolutely particular appearance in consciousness, and that our question should be directed there. Hence the easily understood opinion of today's so-called "Positivist", that what is "here and now given" each time, that ultimately concrete, absolute particular which we called the "phenomenon of ultimate authority" must form the foundation of all knowledge, if, as has been handed down, the universal only borrows its significance from the particular and by itself signifies nothing. Every other particular which has already been thought objectively in some way, whether it be a thing or occurrence or instance of a relation is already a universal in comparison with that ultimate concrete entity, i.e. it has been already raised to universal validity, even though it is a particular thing in relationship to the higher universality of the species or the law. It already supposes and includes the first objectification.

Positivism is only the consistent fulfillment of nominalism in so far as it keeps in view the ultimate particular and only grants original and indissoluble truth to this its "positive fact", while only awarding reality or truth to that which has already been generalized (thus also to the particular, in so far as it has already been raised to that which is to be universally so represented) in as far as what is generalized represents that ultimate "positive fact".

Idealism, on the contrary, seeks the root and ground of truth and reality, even of the particular, in universals or "ideals". For idealism the law is plainly what is determining, primary, basic. Through it and according to its standards alone the particular receives the validity and significance of truth, reality.

For the Positivists, the universal has significance in knowledge only in as far as it signifies the particular whose universal it is; it borrows all the validity which it can claim in knowledge from the particular. In itself it has no original claim to validity.

For the Idealists, on the contrary, the particular has significance in knowledge because of the universal whose particular it is; it borrows all the validity which it can claim in knowledge from the universal. In itself it has no original claim to validity.

Measured against this sharpest formulation of the opposition, the position which Aristotle took shows itself a weak compromise. It is no less noteworthy that in spite of this the large majority of recent philosophers were still first inclined to accept Aristotle's attempted compromise. According to Aristotle the universal surely has its unimpeachable significance in knowledge. Objectively, however, only the particular is designated as real; the universal is only real as representative of the particular, that is, as representing many similar entities. The universal is not an object for itself apart from the particular objects, but just the same it is the only grounding element in knowledge, the first and the determining factor in validity.
Why this compromise in untenable hardly needs discussion. Knowledge should after all correspond to its object. If the very thing valid for knowledge should not be valid for its object this would signify that knowledge would neither correspond to its object nor need to.

Certainly the species "human" is never present (voucheden) as a thing (much less as a particular thing) in addition to or apart from the individuals of the species. Certainly the species of occurrences (to borrow Helmholtz' term for the laws of nature) never represent a (single) occurrence apart from or in addition to the particular instances of such occurrences. Similarly, universal relations such as those expressed in the statement $1 + 1 = 2$ do not exist or occur apart from the particular instances of such relations. If Aristotle proved these conclusions, then he proved something which has never been disputed by a thinking being. Probably even Plato did not need to be taught that the universal is not "real" in this sense, that is, does not represent a thing or event or actual process beyond being the representative of the particular, in the particular, namely in all particulars that fall under this universal.

On the other hand Plato knew that the particular could only be valid as something actual, or being (whether thing, occurrence or relationship) by virtue of the universal, as a particular instance of the universal, or to put it in modern terms, as an instance of the law. And that is the meaning of all "Idealism", at least the meaning of the Idealism which we intend to uphold.

What is the particular, if it is not the particular instance of the universal? The particular is no more for itself, apart from and in addition to the universal (choris para ta katholou) than the universal is for itself, in addition to and apart from the particular (choris para ta kath' hekasta).

One could be tempted to say that Aristotle, fighting a supposed Platonic hypostasis of the universal as existing on its own, fell into a no less untenable, incomprehensible hypostasis of the particular. In much the same way as in Aristotle's opinion Plato made universality a property of things, Aristotle made particularity a property of things. Apart from the consideration (Betrachtung) to which things are subject in knowledge particularity is as thoroughly inexplicable and meaningless as is universality.

The thing is particular, to be sure, in as far as it is taken as particular in (objective) consideration, but neither apart from this nor for itself. And what is valid for the particular thing is also valid for the particular occurrence and the particular instance of a relation.

Therefore not only universality but particularity too — or more correctly and concisely, the relation of the particular and the universal — takes place in knowledge. Consequently that relation has its place in the object in as far as the object exists for knowledge, for we cannot know or speak of any object, so not of any (objective) meaning of universal or particular other than that which exists for knowledge. The particular thing "in itself" suffers from exactly the same absurdities as the supposedly Platonic universal thing "in itself". The Platonic kath'hauto rightly signifies
the unity in which the law is thought, the Aristotelian *kath’ hekaston* the
particularity in which the instance of the law is thought — in knowledge.

The particular entity can always be characterized only by universal
determinations, through classification in the universal, all-inclusive
frameworks of space and time and in the all-inclusive network of causal
connection through which each particular is fixed in its place in space and
time, i.e., determined with universal validity. Thus the particular proves
itself in fact an instance of the universal, as conversely the universal is the
essence (Innbegriff) of the particular.

But finally it is the fundamental law of *knowledge* which prescribes
the opposition and mutual relation of particular and universal, which is
unremovable in knowledge and therefore valid for the object (as object of
knowledge).

7.

Now we have only to apply this result to that ultimate concrete, the
absolute particularity, the "here and now given" of the Positivist, in order
to reach a sure resolution of the question we raised.

It is an error to believe that that ultimate concrete "here and now
given" or representation could be the ground of knowledge as the primary
and sole positive factor which includes (fassen) everything in advance.
Not only can this opinion not be supported, not only does it lead to
unacceptable consequences, but it also shows itself on closer inspection to
be an almost incomprehensible illusion.17 How do we grasp this ultimate
concrete here and now appearing? It is to be grasped, if at all, only when it
is determined in concepts; but every such determination occurs from the
standpoint of the universal. Every answer which can ever be given to the
question what is the here and now appearing is only possible in universal
expressions, universal determinations of quality and quantity, universally
expressed relations to other already known objects. If I say "it is here, it is
this, it is now", all these determinations aim at denoting the particular as
particular, but they denote it only through determinations of universal
applicability. They classify the particular in the universal order of space
and time, an already presupposed order of things. Thus all the expressions
with which the Positivist attempts to characterize his "positive fact"
before any universal conceptual determination — particularity and con-
creteness, identity of place and of time, givenness (as content of
consciousness, so subjectivity) and, finally, positiveness itself (incontest-
able position (Setzung) ) — all these contain nothing but conceptual
determinations, indeed of the highest universality and abstractness. Even
the "positive fact" can obviously not be grasped other than through such
means, and yet the goal set was to overcome the emptiness of mere
abstraction.

Naturally the Positivist will seek to justify himself. He will say that
while universal abstract concepts are surely necessary to describe and
arrange what is immediately experienced, the immediate experience is in itself absolutely particular and concrete.

This seems to me to be a rather exact repetition of Aristotle’s error. Aristotle believed that the thing itself was in itself concrete and particular, even though, as he could not deny, knowledge could only describe and interpret it with the help of universal abstract concepts. What then is the thing itself, or as the Positivist would say, the appearance itself? What does it mean that it has in itself the absolute particularity and determinacy which we demand? If it is not determinate for us, then it cannot be the origin of knowledge for us, but it is only determinate for us in so far as we have determined it, and this can only happen through universal concepts.

However, the Positivist will say that that which is universally determined in the concept must after all be concretely given in the particular appearance; otherwise the determination would not apply to the given appearance, as we too required.

But what does “given” mean here? Known? Perceived? That would again include the determination which one must admit is only possible through concepts. The concreteness of the appearance is only “given” in the act as a determinable X which is now to be determined, like an Aristotelian potential being. It is given only in the sense of an appointed task, not as a datum of knowledge through which other unknowns could be determined.

Thus it becomes more and more clear that the “positive fact”, the supposed primary given, is much more than which is sought. One might even say it is the ultimate goal. It is in the concept of this goal that the utmost is demanded which could be achieved by knowledge in its final completion. And this last has been made first, the sought-for has been taken for a datum, so the task of knowledge has been turned upside-down. The “positive fact” is spoken of as having been already determined, while determination is always first the achievement of knowledge.

Yet Positivism rests on a correct insight. Even if all determination is first the achievement of knowledge, one cannot dismiss the reflection that something must be “given” before this achievement, something subjectively original and immediate which is to be determined and so first brought to objectivity.

In fact there is something given before the achievement of knowledge, namely the task. One might also say: the object is given, namely as an X, something which is yet to be determined, not as a known quantity.

Thus positivism does not fail by seeking the ultimate given, the subjectively original “phenomenon of ultimate authority” and seeing in it the immediacy of (subjective) consciousness. What is false is the opinion that this sought-after (actually, postulated) immediate and original content of subjective consciousness can be made the basis of knowledge as an immediate original datum. Rather the question is now whether it can be arrived at at all by the means of knowledge? Subjectivity as such will not allow itself to be grasped in its immediate aspect. It can only be grasped,
in as far as this is possible at all, in concepts, because there is absolutely no
other organon of knowledge. Yet when it is grasped in concepts it is no
longer absolutely immediate and subjective, but has always already been
objectified. The level of pure subjectivity would be identical with the level
of absolute indeterminacy. One may reason back to this, as to the original
chaos, but one cannot lay hold of it in itself. The constructive objectifying
achievement of knowledge always comes first; from it we reconstruct as
far as possible the level of original subjectivity which could never be
reached by knowledge apart from this reconstruction which proceeds
from the already completed objective construction. In this reconstruction
we, so to speak, objectify subjectivity as such. This objectification of
subjectivity deserves to be called a constructed fiction much more than
does that construction on which “objects” rest, which grounds reality and
overcomes all fiction. Our task at first seemed to be to show how subjecti-
vity could be overcome in a non-fictitious concept of the object. Now
objectivity shows itself so impossible to overcome that it appears much
more difficult to salvage a proper non-fictitious significance for subjectivity.
Subjectivity is primary, in so far as the task of knowledge is posed before
it is solved, but it cannot be called a given in the sense of being a datum of
knowledge. The real beginnings and grounds of knowledge are instead
always ultimate objective unities. Thus mathematics is not founded on
phenomena which are given before any abstraction. On the contrary, it
rests on fundamental abstractions, expressions of the unity of determina-
tion of possible phenomena such as the point, line, straightness, equality,
etc. These together comprise and express in determinate ways the basic
function of objectification: unification (Einsetzung), the Kantian (also
Platonic) “unity of the manifold”. Only thus are the unequivocally deter-
minate “Phenomena” of the sciences (particularly the natural sciences)
possible; only the phenomenon which is determined in this way can be
called a datum of knowledge and serve as a basis for further determina-
tions.\(^{18}\) Whoever seeks the object in appearance seeks such unequivocal
determinations. Even common representation seeks them; in its naming,
in the unified meaning of words, it has at least an analogy to those unities
which ground the sciences. These basic scientific unities attempt to fulfill
in a more developed and durable way the same tasks which language
fulfills sufficiently for the immediate purposes of practical life. Even the
Positivist intends his positive facts to mean something unequivocally
determinate, as all his expressions betray. But one asks in vain how this
determinacy, this positiveness would be possible without the determining
and thus “positing” function (“setzende” Funktion) whose original rights
we have asserted.

This should have sufficiently proven the independence and priority
of the objective grounding of knowledge as opposed to the subjective.
Science not only may not, it can not proceed from anything other than
objective unities; there is just no other possible beginning for knowledge.
It is completely impossible to grasp the ultimate subjectivity in itself; it
can only be determined by objective unities in concepts. Something which cannot be grasped for itself in a way appropriate to knowledge cannot be used to support knowledge. So we have justified the autonomy of objective knowledge and its claim to be allowed to seek its grounding only in its own internal connections (Zusammenhang). In that network of connections every more concrete objectification first presupposes highly conceptual determinations which make it possible. Science therefore correctly takes these highest unities as its foundation, its secure beginning on an already objectivized basis. Thus what we believed necessary to assume from the outset has held good: that the grounding of the objective validity of knowledge can and must itself be thoroughly objective. Questions about the subjective origins of knowledge do have legitimacy and significance, but both their legitimacy and significance are derived and, so to speak, borrowed. The true and original legitimacy lies on the side of objective unities, as we had hoped.

We might designate the law of lawfulness itself as the basic objective law of knowledge. This is the law that the view of things according to laws (gesetzmässig Ansicht) is the true and objective view. All specific laws of knowledge are only the specific concrete forms of this basic law. The two beloved propositions of formal logic, non-contradiction and sufficient reason, are only very abstract analytical versions of this basic law whose concrete, i.e. synthetic, form it was Kant's great undertaking to discover.

We must call the grounding of knowledge reached in such a way absolutely objective, not subjective. The demand for the autonomy of knowledge has been fulfilled, for grounding occurs through knowledge's own law. This grounding belongs to a different genus, moves in the opposite direction than that reconstruction or original subjectivity in which we saw the most acceptable sense of the demand for a psychological grounding of knowledge. Nor does the objective presuppose the psychological, but rather forms the indispensable prerequisite for the psychological view. To authenticate the laws of knowledge we must move in the constructive direction of knowledge, in the direction of objectification, for it is the ultimate objective unities we seek.

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With this our main task is accomplished. Some supplementary observations which would be useful for further explanation of the relationship between objective and subjective grounding may be left untouched for the present. To begin with, one could comment on the positive significance and methods of subjective grounding (especially considering the relationship between logic and psychology), to which could properly be appended the contemplated elucidation of Kant's position on our question. Secondly, on the basis of our findings, the type of lawfulness which belongs to the objective laws of knowledge could be more exactly determined. This is a point over which a certain lack of clarity reigns among logicians. Thirdly, it might seem appropriate to at least point out the next steps which logic
should take beyond the fundamental determinations which we have reached. These three points may be kept in reserve for another essay.\textsuperscript{19}

References

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1. This essay, "Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis", was published in Philosophische Monatshefte xxiii (1887), pp. 257-286. In Natorp's Einleitung in die Psychologie (Freiburg i. B., 1888), published the following year, section 14 bears the same title and covers similar arguments.

2. "In this view, that the normative notion of 'ought' does not form part of the content of logical laws, I am glad to find myself in agreement with Natorp. . . . There are certain other equally important rapprochements between these Prolegomena and the distinguished thinker's present work, which unhappily came too late to assist in forming and expounding these thoughts. Two previous writings of Natorp, the above quoted article from Phil. Monatshefte, xxiii and the Einleitung in die Psychologie, stimulated me, however — though other points in them provoked me to controversy." (Logical Investigations, "Prolegomena to Pure Logic," section 41; Findlay translation, p. 169n. Cf. also section 19.)

3. Logical Investigations, V, section 8, and Ideas, section 57.

4. The changes in Natorp's later philosophy are lucidly discussed in Ernst Cassirer's memorial to Natorp, "Paul Natorp", Kunststudien xxx (1925), pp. 273-298.

5. "The 'Theory of knowledge' . . . is at bottom the metaphysics and ontology based on truth as the certainty of guaranteed representation . . . this business of guaranteeing is only a consequence of the reinterpretation of Being as objectivity and representedness. . . . 'Theory of knowledge' is the title for the increasing essential powerlessness of modern metaphysics to know its own essence and the ground of that essence." ("Überwindung der Metaphysik," Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen, 1967), I, p. 67; The End of Philosophy New York, 1973), pp. 88-89. For Heidegger's evaluation of the Marburg approach to Kant, cf. his remarks in Die Frage nach dem Ding (What is a Thing?), sections B., I., I and B., II., 3, e., as well as the polemic against overly epistemological interpretations of Kant which runs all through Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.

6. Platonische Ideenlehre, Leipzig, 1902; the systematic works include, among others, Die Logische Grundlagen der Exakten Wissenschaften, Leipzig and Berlin, 1910; Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritische Methode, Tübingen, 1912; Vorlesungen über praktische Philosophie, Erlangen, 1925. A brief description of Natorp's life and bibliography of his books can be found in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy under his name and also under 'NeoKantianism'; the latter is perhaps the more useful article.

7. Though what Natorp means by "Logik" is closer to what is called in English "epistemology", I have kept the cognate translation "logic" to preserve the Kantian emphasis and indicate kinship to both German Idealism and Logical Positivism.

8. Throughout the essay Natorp uses "Objekt" and "Gegenstand" and their derivatives interchangeably. I have translated both by "object".

9. The first section of the essay provides a compressed statement of the principles Natorp will use to settle his questions later. The reader who finds this section obscure should persevere with trust that at least some further explanation will be forthcoming.

10. Natorp uses "Sinn" and "Bedeutung" and their derivatives in a somewhat confusing fashion. I have preserved the difference by translating "Sinn" as "meaning" and "Bedeutung" as "significance" throughout.

11. The comparison of knowing an object to solving an equation is elucidated (with familiar echoes) in the Logische Grundlagen, pp. 32-33: "The word 'Object', a Latin term which in literal German would be Gegenwurf (that which is thrown over against) or, more freely rendered, Vorwurf (that which is thrown ahead), stands as the almost exact translation of the Greek pro-blema (that which is thrown forward). . . . So just as the x, y, etc. of an equation only have meaning in and for the equation, on the basis of the meaning of the equation as a whole and in relation to the known constant quantities . . . so and only so is the great X of knowledge, the object, comprehensible. . . . The basic sorts of relation which makes knowledge possible are presupposed and already sketched in advance in the Vorwurf of knowledge, they are 'cast forward' ('entworfen'). The object of knowledge becomes a project (das
Objekt . . . Projekt, das Gegenwurf Vorwurf."

12. I.e. subject, hypo-keimennon, that which underlies.

13. Natorp has in view as opponents not only the empiricists and classic positivists but those "Kantians", such as Lange, Riehl, Vaihinger, and Helmholtz, who interpreted Kant psychologically.

14. I have inserted the German "Zusammenhang" occasionally to show the varying ways it has been translated. The concept is unusually important for Natorp, as he makes it the key to the Kantian transcendental constitution of knowledge. "What is primal is neither affirmation nor negation, neither identity nor difference (let alone contradiction), neither synthesis nor analysis, but connection-in-context (Zusammenhang), and this not through a subsequent harmonizing and unifying but through radical unity of origin" (Logische Grundlagen, p. 21).

15. Cf. Cassirer's discussion of this "appearing itself" and his references to the Allgemeine Psychologie, chapter 2, in the article cited above, p. 282.

16. "Subjectivity and objectivity are only the two directions on one and the same road of knowledge. Knowing is in itself neither subjective nor objective; both subjectivity and objectivity find their place only in knowing, in an unremovable mutual relation to one another" (Logik in Leitsätzen (Marburg, 1910), p. 7).


18. "Plato's deepest discovery was that the knowledge found in science exists through an infinite process of limiting the unlimited, that in this process there are no absolute beginning nor ending points, but . . . for every relative beginning an earlier beginning, for every relative conclusion a further conclusion, and even in the center where thought might seem to take a firm stand, always a yet more central point to search for and ultimately to find. Thus there can be no more talk of a 'fact' in the sense of completed knowledge" (Logische Grundlagen, pp. 13-14). The hypothetical character of all knowledge means that for Natorp the "fact" of the sciences, on which Cohen had based his analysis of knowledge, becomes the process of scientific advance (their "factum" becomes "fieri", as Natorp says in the Logische Grundlagen, p. 14).

19. No single essay of Natorp's fulfills the promissory note with which this essay ends, but the topics are treated in his larger systematic writings, the Logische Grundlagen and the Allgemeine Psychologie, and in such essays as "Quantität und Qualität in Begriff, Urteil und gegenständlicher Erkenntnis", Philosophische Monatshefte xxvii (1890), pp. 11f and 129ff, and "Zur Frage der logischen Methode. Mit Beziehung auf E. Husserls Logische Untersuchungen", Kantsstudien vi (1901), pp. 270ff.